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The Primary Caretaker Presumption:
Have We Been Presuming Too Much?
PAUL L. SMITH*
The court officer barks, "all rise," and while exiting the courtroom, I see out the
comer of my eye the mother of the two children collapse into the arms of her own
mother. The father's family has rushed to his side. It would not surprise me if they
pick him up on their shoulders and carry him out of the courtroom for a victory
celebration. As the door to my chambers closes, I also collapse into my chair. My
stomach aches and a feeling of frustration floods over me. The decision I have
made will affect two children's lives forever. They will have graduations,
weddings, and holidays to share with their parents, but separately. Instead of
working together, these two parents have decided to do everything they can to
hurt each other and somehow try to even the score. Can we not do something
better? I think we can.'
INTIODUCTION
Divorce is an issue which almost every American, in one way or another, has to
deal with. As adults, we can try to explain the rational reasons for divorce and we can
cope with the consequences. Children who are affected by divorce, however, may not
understand the personal, practical, or legal reasons for divorce, and they may be
confused and upset by the repercussions.
Divorce is increasing at an alarming rate. Nearly fifty percent of all marriages in
the United States now end in divorce. An estimated forty percent of all children
born to married mothers will be affected by the divorce of their parents. In
addition, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of nontraditional families
in recent decades....
[I]t is not surprising that approximately one million children are affected by
custody determinations each year.2
*J.D., December 1999, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I would like
to thank my parents, Earl and Darla Smith, for their emotional and financial support, which has
always allowed me to achieve anything I have set my mind to. Also, I would like to thank my
fiancee, Bryn Wittmayer, for her constant love and support which helped guide me through a
busy second year of law school which included the writing of this Note. Finally, I would like
to thank Professor Susan Williams for her guidance in helping me select the subject matter for
this Note and her helpful comments on earlier versions of this Note.
1. Judge Don R. Ash, Bridge over Troubled Water: Changing the Custody Law in
Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. RaV. 769, 772 (1997). Judge Ash is a family court judge in
Tennessee whose primary concern is how to protect children who are the true victims of all
custody disputes. In this passage he describes the helplessness he feels as ajudge because there
often is not a good standard or guideline to assist those in authority in making important
decisions like deciding which parent should receive custody in a divorce.
2. Debra L. Swank, Day Care and Parental Employment: What Weight Should They Be
Given in Child Custody Disputes?, 41 VILL. L. REV. 909, 928 (1996) (footnote omitted); see
also Ash, supra note 1, at 773 (providing additional statistical information about divorce in the
United States); Susan Beth Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "the Best Interest of the
Child" Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 847-48 (1997) (same).
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When making custody determinations, it is these one million children to whom the
family courts of America should be tailoring their decisions.
Several different approaches for making custody determinations have been tried
and continue to be tried. Many states seek to protect the "best interest of the child."
Other jurisdictions presume that divorcing parents will have joint custody. Others
make presumptions about who should be awarded custody based on the child's age
or sex. Finally, some states follow, to an extent, a standard which was introduced to
the legal community in 1981 and which has since increased in popularity: the primary
caretaker presumption.
The primary caretaker presumption, although only in effect as the sole factor for
child custody determinations in one state, West Virginia, has received a significant
following in the academic journals in recent years.' However, the primary caretaker
presumption has been criticized from all sides of the child custody debate in the past
ten years.4 Father's rights groups have claimed that it is actually a maternal preference
disguised as a gender neutral rule.5 Mother's rights advocates argue that the vague
3. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia's Joint Custody
Presumption: Misplaced Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 767, 818-19
(1997); Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law, 52 LA. L. REV. 607, 640-41 (1992);
Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender Years Presumption to a Primary Parent Presumption:
Has Anything Really Changed?... Should It?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 83-85 (1993); Francis J.
Catania, Jr., Accounting to Ourselves for Ourselves: An Analysis of Adjudication in the
Resolution ofChildCustodyDisputes, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1228, 1254-55 (1992); HarrietNewman
Cohen, Finding Fairness in Financial Settlements, FAM. ADVOC. Summer 1994, at 57, 59;
Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 770-73 (1988); Jennifer E. Home, The
Brady Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving
Remarried Parents, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2073, 2087 (1993); Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody
and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1,49-56 (1995-96);
Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345 (1993); Anna Maria Maxwell, Court Extends Primary Caretaker
Doctrine to Cases in Which Neither Parent Takes Clear Responsibilityfor the Parental Duties,
48 S.C. L. REV. 113, 115-16 (1996); Kathryn L. Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial
Decision-making Regarding Custody of Minor Children: Looking at the "Best Interests of the
Child" and the "Primary Caretaker" Standards as Utility Rules, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 389,403-
14 (1997); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker
as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481, 533-34 (1987); J. Thomas Oldham, The American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Its Impact on Family Law, 7 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 161, 163-64 (1998); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief
Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175,
177-78 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 809, 850-51 (1998); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong
Places: Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1549
(1994); Jacobs, supra note 2, at 897.
5. See, e.g., Bookspan, supra note 3, at 85; Judith Band Jennison, The Search for Equality
in a Woman's World: Fathers' Rights to Child Custody, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1141, 1153
(1991); Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender
Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 916 (1998).
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"unfitness"6 exception to the presumption leaves too much discretion to a
disproportionately male state judiciary7 and sets a double standard for men and
women.8 Finally, feminists argue that the presumption entrenches gender roles in
society as related to the upbringing of children.9
In Part I of this Note, I will examine the importance of the primary caretaker
presumption as it is used in child custody determinations today and why the debate
on the subject has not been as extensive as it should be. In Part II, I will examine what
the primary caretaker presumption is and how it is applied in its most common forms.
Part III explores the various criticisms of the presumption from many different
perspectives. Also in Part III, I will examine some of the under-reported criticisms
of the presumption and explain why I think the presumption needs more study and
more debate before it is further implemented in the family courts of this country.
Finally, in Part IV, I scrutinize the impact that the primary caretaker presumption has
on children and the way children are treated in the legal system. The primary
caretaker presumption fails where far too many custody rules have failed in the
past-it does not treat children as human beings and fails to recognize the role that
children must play in the custody determination process.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMINING THE
PRIMARY CARETAKER PRESUMPTION
Although there has been a great deal of scholarship with references to the primary
caretaker presumption within the past eighteen.years, it is important to reexamine it
today in a slightly different context.' The problem with most of the recent references
tb this subject in the academic literature is twofold. First, it has focused on some
peripheral effects of the primary caretaker presumption as implemented in West
Virginia and Minnesota. This discussion has not dealt with whether the factors
identified in the presumption actually help the courts identify who the primary
caretaker of a child is or whether the factors help identify who the better custodial
parent will be." Second, most of the literature seems to suggest that the primary
caretaker presumption is rather insignificant because it is only currently used in its
"pure"' form in one state, West Virginia. What this does not recognize is that the
6. Krista Carpenter, Why Are Mothers Still Losing: An Analysis of Gender Bias in Child
Custody Determinations, 1996 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REv. 33, 53.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of the Primary
Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 291, 292-93 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An
Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 209, 256 (1998).
10. For a detailed listing of the academic discussion of the primary caretaker presumption,
see discussion supra text accompanying notes 2-9
11. Some writers have advanced the notion that the primary caretaker presumption was
never intended to grant custody to the "best" parent, but instead is more like a reward for the
parent who sacrificed the most for their children during the course of the marriage. See infra
Part III.B.
12. Sack, supra note 8, at 320. Sack uses the term "pure" to describe the standard when the
primary caretaker presumption is used as the sole rule for determining custody. She would
2000]
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primary caretaker presumption continues to be one factor that many states use when
making a best interest of the child custody determination, and those states often cite
West Virginia for the primary caretaker standard that they use.
The question that should always be asked first when evaluating any rule that uses
proxy factors is do those proxies represent what they are supposed to represent? In
the case of the primary caretaker presumption, there are approximately ten factors
that courts are to use in evaluating who the primary caretaker of a child was during
the marriage. 3 When evaluating this presumption, the first thing we ought to do is
determine if the enumerated factors are, in fact, a good substitute for determining
which parent was the primary caretaker. The academic discussion up to this point has
not addressed this issue, choosing instead to assume that these factors are good
proxies, and jumping straight to a defense or a critique of the presumption. This is
putting the cart before the horse and evaluating the presumption before we truly know
what the presumption represents.
Furthermore, the primary caretaker presumption has only been given cursory
coverage in legal academia as an insignificant doctrine in the big picture of child
custody determinations. 4 This may be because only one state uses the presumption
as its sole test in making custody determinations. 5 Or it could be because
commentators believe that the presumption is in decline in the wake of the Minnesota
legislature's decision to abandon the presumption in favor of returning to a modified
best interest determination. 6 It is possible that because "the great majority of custody
cases are settled by negotiation at some stage,"' 7 many scholars do not feel that it is
important to evaluate a rule which will only be used in the rare circumstance that the
custody determination gets to the point of adjudication. Finally, it could be because
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act continues to read that "[tihe court shall
classify the use of the presumption in West Virginia as "pure," although she would seek to
modify the broad "unfitness" exception that has always been part of West Virginia's primary
caretaker presumption. See id. at 303, 321.
13. See infra text accompanying note 35.
14. Only two prominent law journal pieces since 1990 have taken an extensive look at the
primary caretaker presumption, and even those do not address the initial question posed by this
Part; that is, whether or not we even understand what the primary caretaker presumption is. See
Mercer, supra note 3, at 403-14; Sack, supra note 8, at 292, 300-28. Mercer goes on to note
that "the literature is void of an analysis on how the standard is used by judges and whether
it is indeed 'workable."' Mercer, supra note 3, at 414.
15. West Virginia adopted the presumption in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,362 (W.
Va. 1981), and continues to use the presumption to this day. Minnesota courts experimented
with the presumption beginning in 1985. See Pikulav. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,713-14 (Minn.
1985). The decision of Pikula was legislatively overturned in 1989 because lawmakers felt that
the primary caretaker presumption was too rigid and did not give judges enough discretion to
decide individual cases. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(13) (West Supp. 1999) (stating that
"[t]he primary caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best
interests of the child").
16. See Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake ofMinnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, 75 MMlN. L. REV. 427, 438-39 (1990).
17. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the Limits ofLaw: On Dividing the
Child, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1808, 1817 (1994).
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determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child" and does not lend
any credence to any form of a primary caretaker presumption."8
Whatever the reason for the legal community's neglect of the primary caretaker
presumption, it is unfortunate because the presumption still plays a vital role in
custody determinations across the country. The primary caretaker presumption is a
vital part of a relatively new form of making custody determinations called
"approximation." In a system of approximation, a judge tries to approximate the
amount of time and effort each parent expended raising the children during the
marriage and award the parents the respective amount of custody or decisionmaking
power in the postdivorce childrearing. 9
Therefore, in most cases the law's goal should be to approximate, to the extent
possible, the predivorce role of each parent in the child's life. Because this role
is most likely to reflect the real preferences of each parent, and also to predict
actual caretaking arrangements, an "approximation" rule serves the law's
traditional objectives of promoting continuity and stability for the child more
effectively than do existing rules. Moreover, again because it is more likely to
reflect parents' actual preferences than other custody frameworks, an
approximation rule can reduce the heavy costs of bargaining over custody by
reducing the incentive to exchange entitlements.2"
Although the approximation standard has not been widely adopted, it is an
interesting new approach and may have a role to play in joint custody states in
determining which parent gets a larger amount of physical custody. Additionally,
courts and legislatures across the country, a majority of which use a best interest
standard, continue to incorporate the primary caretaker presumption as one of the
factors in determining what would be in the best interest ofthe child.21 "[T]heprimary
caretaker presumption ... concept 'inheres' in the best interest factors."' "Courts in
18. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1979).
19. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 615, 617 (1992).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Jeff Atkinson, Criteriafor Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 14 (1984) (finding the preference for placing a child with the primary
caretaker to be "[o]ne of the most important factors in child custody determination");
Blakesley, supra note 3, at 640 (arguing that the primary caretaker presumption realizes the
"psychological parent" vision of some best interest standards); Bookspan, supra note 3, at 84;
Federle, supra note 4, at 1548; Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm in Custody Law:
Looking at Parents with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 557 n.89 (1996) (noting that
commentators and numerous state courts endorse primary caretaker standard); Mercer, supra
note 3, at 401; Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1836 (arguing that "California judicial decisions
... plainly indicate ... a very strong preferencej- for parents who acted as primary caretakers
before the separation, finding such placements to be generally consistent with the child's best
interests").
22. William A. Neuman & Tracy Vigness Kolb, A Woman's Touch, 72N.D. L. REV. 953,
962 (1996) (quoting Gravning v. Gravning, 389N.W.2d 621,622 (N.D. 1986)). Judge Levine,
in her dissent from the Gravning majority opinion, extols the virtues of the primary caretaker
presumption. "First. it will generally be in the child's best interest to be in the primary
caretaker's custody... [because t]he intimate interaction of the primary caretaker with the
2000]
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at least sixteen states have identified and showed some favor for the parent who had
been the primary caregiver before the couple separated. Furthermore, courts from at
least seven of these states have identified primary caretaking as a significant factor
in assessing the child's best interests."23 Some commentators have even argued that
there is a trend in the laws of many states towards saying that it is always in the
child's best interest to be with his or her primary caretaker.
At the present time, a majority of states have adopted the theory that the best
interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the parent who is the
"primary caretaker." The primary caretaker has been defined as "the person who,
before the divorce, managed, monitored the day-to-day activities of the child, and
met the child's basic needs including: feeding, clothing, bathing, and protecting
the child's health. 24
It is this line-blurring between different standards for custody determinations that
makes it incredibly important for the legal community not to discount any particular
standard because it has not been implemented in its fullest form in a majority of
jurisdictions.
Finally, even the American Law Institute has proposed adopting a version of the
primary caretaker presumption.2" The primary caretaker presumption is a custody
standard which has achieved prominence in family court jurisprudence and ought to
be thoroughly evaluated by the legal community; this is what I intend to do in this
Note.
II. EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMARY CARETAKER PRESUMPTION
The primary caretaker presumption was first defined and implemented as a
standard in custody decisions by West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Justice
Neely26 in Garska v. McCoy.27
child creates a vital bonding between parent and child." Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 625 (Levine,
J., dissenting). "Second, continuity of care with the primary caretaker is the most objective, and
perhaps only predictor of a child's welfare about which there is agreement and which can be
competently evaluated by judges." Id. "Third, the primary caretaker rule will benefit the
negotiation process between divorcing parents." Id. "Finally, on its face, at least, the primary
caretaker rule is gender neutral; it may benefit either parent." Id.
Throughout her judicial career, until her retirement in 1996, Justice Levine continued to be
a strong proponent of the primary caretaker presumption in North Dakota, even though it was
never adopted in its fullest form in that state.
23. Crippen, supra note 16, at 434 (footnote omitted). The sixteen states are California,
Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. See id. at 434 n.26,
435 n.27, 436 nn.28-30, 438 nn.34 & 41-42.
24. Swank, supra note 2, at 925 (footnote omitted) (quoting Sanford N. Katz, "That They
May Thrive" Goal of Child Custody: Reflections on the Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years
Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary Caretaker Presumption, 8 J. COmNEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 123, 133 (1992)).
25. See Oldham, supra note 3, at 163.
26. Chief Justice Neely was only an Associate Justice at the time the Garska decision was
authored.
27. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
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Under the primary caretaker doctrine, children are divided into three age groups:
1) those of tender years, i.e., under age six; 2) those between the ages of six and
fourteen; and 3) those fourteen years of age and older. For children under the age
of six, an absolute presumption exists in favor of the primary caretaker as
custodian, provided that she or he is a fit parent. For children six years old to
under fourteen, the trial court may hear the child's preference on the record out
of the presence of the parents.... Finally, for children fourteen years and older,
the child is permitted to name his or her custodian if both parents are fit."
Set out like that, the primary caretaker presumption seems fairly straightforward and
should be simple for judges to apply.
The simplicity and predictability of the presumption was one of the many reasons
that Chief Justice Neely was an advocate of, and eventually adopted, the standard in
West Virginia. "The Supreme Court of West Virginia adopted the primary caretaker
standard: 1) to increase the predictability of and standardize custody decisions; 2) to
give parents less incentive to litigate than to settle their custody cases; and 3) to
eliminate the use of children as bargaining chips in the process."29 A panoply of other
legal experts have identified many other advantages to the presumption. Some argue
that it is more objective, does not rely on the use of expert testimony, establishes a
bright line rule,3" protects the party who is at a financial disadvantage, reduces
judicial discretion,3 and is gender-neutral.32 Of course, many others argue that some
of these advantages are in fact disadvantages.33
The real trick of applying the presumption comes in deciding who the primary
caretaker is. "In order to determine the identity of the primary caretaker, the trial
court must ascertain which parent took primary responsibility for the recurring needs
of the child."34 The court looks at the following exhaustive list of factors to determine
which parent was, in fact, the primary caretaker:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3)
purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and
trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school,
i.e., transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings;
28. Lisa A. Kelly, Children and Divorce: Custody Determinations Under West Virginia
Law, W. VA. LAW. May 1995, at 22.
29. Mercer, supra note 3, at 408 (citing Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 361-62). But cf Blakesley,
supra note 3, at 641 (explaining that litigation actually increased in Minnesota over custody
issues during its four year experiment with the presumption).
30. But cf Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social
Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 253, 318 ("Consistency for its
own sake, however, is not a virtue.").
31. See LaFrance, supra note 3, at 50; Law & Hennessey, supra note 3, at 355; cf. O'Kelly,
supra note 3, at 511-33. O'Kelly argues that the six benefits of adopting the primary caretaker
presumption are that it promotes continuing of the psychological relationship with the primary
parent, it provides an objective basis for forecasting future parenting, it deters litigants from
using custody as a weapon, it encourages private settlement, it is very easy forjudges to apply,
and it permits effective appellate review of the trial court's decision.
32. See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 895; Polikoff, supra note 3, at 175.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. Kelly, supra note 28, at 22.
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(6) arranging alternative care, [that is] babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child
to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the
morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9)
educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills,
i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.35
In theory, the court will determine which parent did more of the things which are
enumerated on the above list, and that parent will be deemed the primary caretaker.
There are two other small, but important, aspects to the primary caretaker
presumption as adopted in West Virginia. First, where the court determines that
neither parent meets the standards for being a primary caretaker, neither will enjoy
the presumption. 6 "[T]his presumption should only be applied when one parent has
'clearly' taken responsibility for the child."37 The rationale for this exception should
be evident. If the court is not convinced that either parent was a primary caretaker,
it would be inappropriate to afford either parent the benefit of the presumption. This
is not to say that one or both of the parents were not good parents; it merely
recognizes that in modem America it is likely that both parents will work outside the
home, and neither could claim to be a primary caretaker under the enumerated
factors. It also captures the notion that sometimes both parents are extremely involved
and it is, therefore, impossible to label either one of them as the "primary caretaker."
"If the court finds that the parties evenly shared the parenting duties, then neither
party is entitled to the presumption that flows from primary caretaker and the court
must make further inquiry into the 'relative degrees of parental competence."' 3
"When neither parent has so clearly assumed the parental role, the court is to rely on
other factors, including the competence of each parent, the resources of each parent,
the opinions of third parties, and the age, health, and sex of the child."39
The final aspect of the primary caretaker presumption, and one that has taken
significant criticism from mothers advocacy groups and feminists, is the "unfitness"
exception. This exception simply states that even if one parent is determined to be the
primary caretaker, the court will not award custody to that parent if he or she is
deemed to be unfit.4" This exception grants significant discretion to the trial judge to
determine whether or not the primary caretaker is unfit, and it is this discretion which
has drawn objections.4
35. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
36. See Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S., 435 S.E.2d 6,9 (W. Va. 1993); Lewis v. Lewis,
433 S.E.2d 536, 539 (W. Va. 1993); Channell v. Channell, 432 S.E.2d 203, 205 (W. Va.
1,993); Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363 (W. Va. 1981).
37. Maxwell, supra note 3, at 113.
38. Kelly, supra note 28, at 22 (quoting Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363).
39. Maxwell, supra note 3, at 115.
40. See Francis J. Catania, Jr., Accounting to Ourselves for Ourselves: An Analysis of
Adjudication in the Resolution of Child Custody Disputes, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1228, 1262 (1992).
41. See infra Part III.A.
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III. CRITICISMS OF THE PRIMARY CARETAKER PRESUMPTION
A. Common Criticisms42
Although there are many criticisms of the primary caretaker presumption, to
discuss them all would be beyond the scope of this Note. There are however, several
common themes which arise in critiques of the presumption and I will look at some
of these critiques in turn. Critics from all across the spectrum have argued that the
presumption favors women, or that it favors men. They have argued that it entrenches
gender stereotypes. They have argued that it is difficult for judges to apply, and
finally that judges still have too much discretion in making custody decisions under
a primary caretaker regime.
1. The Primary Caretaker Presumption Is Sexist
The most obvious criticism of the presumption is that it favors women. "The
primary caretaker standard, adopted explicitly in West Virginia and Minnesota, and
implicitly in a number of other jurisdictions, may be a thinly veiled return to the
maternal preference standard."43 Some commentators have been even more critical
of the sexism inherent in the presumption. "The Minnesota primary caretaker
presumption was, quite simply, the tender years doctrine shed of its sexist skin, but
not its sexist operation; mothers are still overwhelmingly considered to be primary
caretakers, especially for young children."" Under the maternal preference standard,
an outgrowth of the tender years presumption, women were assumed to be better
caretakers, and thus were given custody of the children absent extenuating
circumstances. The primary caretaker preference even includes a tender years
presumption within the body of its rule. Furthermore, there can be little doubt about
the sexist nature of the primary caretaker presumption when "Chief Justice Neely, a
strong and forceful advocate of the primary caretaker rule, writes that such a rule
spells 'mother."' 4
Additionally, the presumption has also been sexist in its application, and the sexism
can cut against the women as well. An example of this involves the use of "bad
morals" as a reason for judges to deem one parent or the other unfit. This is often
referred to as "sexual misconduct." "For the purpose of determining parental fitness,
42. 1 want to be clear that I take no positions on any of these common criticisms of the
presumption. I think the arguments on both sides of these objections have merit and have
flaws. The more important criticisms, in my mind, are those identified infra Part III.B. I
include this section only to show where most of the debate on the primary caretaker
presumption presently lies, and that there are gaps in this debate.
43. Nacy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1075-76 (1996); see also Ash, supra note 1, at 793; Cohen, supra note
3, at 59; Katz, supra note 24, at 133; Law & Hennessey, supra note 3, at 354; Oldham, supra
note 3, at 164.
44. Jennison, supra note 5, at 1153.
45. Katz, supra note 24, at 133. As discussed supra Part Ill, Chief JusticeNeely is also the
one who wrote the opinion in Garska which implemented the first use of the primary caretaker
presumption in the nation.
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it seems that judicially defined 'sexual misconduct' is treated as wholly irrelevant
when perpetrated by a man, but entirely relevant (and often sufficient proof of
unfitness) when committed by a woman."46
Despite these criticisms, many defenders of the presumption point out that this is
a strictly gender-neutral standard and if fathers want custody of their children after
divorce, they should take a more active role in their caretaking during the marriage.
Regardless, the primary concern must be for the child's interest. The child's
interests are best served through placement with their [sic] primary caretaker;
gender is not the issue. Therefore, if the father has been the primary caretaker, he
will be awarded custody. Rather than acting as a disadvantage to fathers, such a
standard should have the effect of encouraging fathers to be more active and
involved parents.4"
Women have always had to sacrifice career goals in order to raise their children, and
the primary caretaker presumption recognizes this, and rewards women for this
sacrifice."
2. The Primary Caretaker Presumption
Entrenches Gender Stereotypes
As was discussed in the previous subsection, mothers are much more likely than
fathers to be deemed the primary caretakers of their children during marriage. As a
result, the factors listed in the primary caretaker presumption's list will not be deemed
to represent who the most committed parent is; they will instead become a proxy for
motherhood. "It should also be said, however, that theprimary caretaker presumption
operates to confirm maternal custody because mothers and fathers continue to
allocate childrearing responsibilities in 'traditional' ways during marriage and
themselves value continuity of child care."49 Because society expects mothers to be
the primary caretaker of the children, it will hold women to a higher, idealized
standard of motherhood.
Since men are traditionally expected to be full-time workers, fathers do not face
this disadvantage. In fact, a man with a full-timejob who provides any assistance
in childrearing, however limited, looks like a dedicated father, while a woman
with a full-time job who still does primary, but not all, caretaking, looks like
-"half' a mother, dissatisfied with the childrearing role.50
46. Sack, supra note 8, at 303.
47. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 61; see also Polikoff, supra note 3, at 178.
48. See Bookspan, supra note 3, at 84; Federle, supra note 4, at 1548; Fineman, supra note
3, at 773 ("[E]ven though both parents work, mothers' career sacrifices for their children
would often qualify them as the primary caretakers."); Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1832-33
("Mothers and fathers generally agreed that mothers had been more involved than fathers in
childrearing prior to separation .... ).
49. Teitelbaum, supra note 17, at 1837.
50. Polikoff, supra note 3, at 179-80; see also Home, supra note 3, at 2125-29; Jacobs,
supra note 2; Maxwell, supra note 3, at 119.
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"The danger in such a presumption is that some courts don't recognize that the
mother is the primary caretaker even when she has a career outside the home; a nanny
notwithstanding, [m]other does a second shift at home."'" What this, in effect, means
is that fathers will be given significantly more credit by the courts for the work they
do in raising children during marriage than mothers will. This bias will filter through
the system to the lawyers and litigants who decide most custody cases before the
matter ever gets before a judge.
In response to a suggestion that the primary caretaker presumption replace the
BIOC [Best Interest of the Child] analysis, one commentator observed that "any
new presumptions will affect not only the decisions ofjtudges who apply them but
also the planning and negotiating of the parents who know they will be applied."
During a divorce, child custody and support are negotiated along with property
division and maintenance; this bargaining takes place "in the shadow of the law."
It is not unheard of for one parent to successfully make financial demands on the
other by threatening to litigate custody.52
Granted, the fact that gender stereotypes exist in society and in the judicial system is
not the fault of the primary caretaker presumption. However, in order to claim that
the presumption offers a better solution, many critics argue that it should deal with
these inequities rather than perpetuate the stereotypes.
3. The Primary Caretaker Presumption Is
Difficult for Judges To Apply
There are several ways that courts struggle when attempting to apply the
presumption, and there is some evidence that the presumption is not as easy and
mechanical in application as some would suggest. "When courts apply presumptions,
the hard cases are the ones where the counterproof is sufficient, but not conclusive." 3
One example of a difficult decision for ajudge occurs when the parents' roles have
changed during the child's lifetime. It is quite common for mothers to stay at home
with their children for the first five years, but once the kids reach school age, the
mother also goes back to work. When you combine that with the possibility that the
father has lost his job and spends more time with the children than he did earlier in
their lives, judges are presented with a difficult situation.
Another problem occurs because "[i]n jurisdictions where a primary caretaker
presumption exists, courts may have difficulty in determining which parent is the
primary caretaker when both parents are employed full-time." 4 Although the West
Virginia rule proclaims that if it is not clear which parent is the primary caretaker,
then neither will enjoy the presumption, courts still will have a tendency to try to
determine which parent is the primary caretaker, especially when that is just one
51. Cohen, supra note 3, at 59; see also Becker, supra note 9, at 256-57 (noting that even
judges expect more from mothers than fathers).
52. Ball & Pea, supra note 30, at 323 (quoting David L. Chambers, Rethinking the
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 480 (1984)
(footnote omitted)).
53. Id. at 325; see also Law & Hennessey, supra note 3, at 358.
54. Swank, supra note 2, at 945-46.
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factor among many. Additionally, what good is such a presumption if the judge
cannot use it because neither parent meets the criterion? Custody determinations
under this regime would be no easier for judges than custody determinations under
any other system.
A third problem that judges face is the situation where one parent has acted as
primary caretaker for one child but not another. Courts have long expressed a
reluctance to separate siblings in custody proceedings and, I think, would continue
to do so even in primary caretaker jurisdictions. This means the court would have to
decide which child got to stay with her primary caretaker, and which one did not.
The final big problem that judges face in applying the presumption is how far back
to look to determine who is the primary caretaker."5 Some courts look at the situation
right before the divorce. Some look at the caretaking arrafigements prior to the
breakdown of the marriage (which could be many years before the actual divorce).,6
Others still examine the caretaking arrangements throughout the entirety of the
child's life.5 7 However the court does it, the mechanistic approach of the primary
caretaker presumption will have to be abandoned in favor ofjudicial discretion."
4. The Primary Caretaker Presumption Grants
Judges Too Much Discretion
As mentioned in Part III of this Note, there is a major qualification to the primary
caretakerpresumption-the unfitness exception. In orderto implementthis exception,
judges must make discretionary, and often subjective, judgements about whether the
primary caretaker is a fit parent.5 9 "[T]he vagueness of the unfitness exception
reintroduces unfetteredjudicial discretion into the primary caretaker standard."' This
discretion is criticized in Part III.A.3, but it is an especially weighty problem in this
area, because standards for parental unfitness are traditionally quite vague.
In reality, the primary caretaker standard falls short of the ideal, as the
seemingly narrow exception for "unfit" primary caretakers effectively swallows
the rule in many cases. This exception has been read expansively by courts at both
the trial and appellate levels. Simple determinations of which parent is the primary
caretaker have become vicious battles over each spouse's unfitness."'
When discretion allows an exception to "swallow the rule," then the rule is doomed
to failure.
55. See Mercer, supra note 3, at 408.
56. See id. at 407-08.
57. See id.
58. See infra Part III.A.4.
59. I do not mean to suggest in this Part, or in any part of this Note, that judges do not
exercise their discretion wisely and prudently; I am sure that most do. However, it is an
inescapable fact of human nature that everyone, evenjudges, approaches situations with biases
and preconceived ideas. The fact that mostjudges in this country are male no doubt means that
some of their biases are going to adversely affect women.
60. Sack, supra note 8, at 293; see also Jacobs, supra note 2, at 897.
61. Sack, supra note 8, at 303.
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This argument cuts against the nonprimary caretaker (often the father) as well.
The fact that the secondary caretaker allowed the primary caretaker to dominate
appears to place the secondary parent in a "Catch 22" situation. If the primary
parent is unfit, and the secondary parent was aware ofthat fact, then the secondary
parent was obviously not acting in his child's best interests in allowing the unfit
primary parent to care for the child. In most cases, evidence that the
"non-primary" parent allowed the child to be cared for mostly by the "primary
caretaker" seems to militate against a finding of unfitness.6'
When the nonprimary caretaker argues that the court should find the primary
caretaker unfit, and thus rebuts the presumption, a diligent judge would inquire why
the primary caretaker was allowed so much control over the children's upbringing.
The fact that the nonprimary caretaker allowed this supposed "unfit" person to be the
primary caretaker, may indicate that he (or she) is also unfit. This would also put the
court in a terrible bind, because now both parents may be claiming to be the primary
caretaker andthey may both be claiming that the other is unfit. This type of situation
would force the court to abandon the presumption in favor of some other test or the
judge's own discretion.
An example of this discretion being harmful to women is that "while most of the
reported cases decided on the primary caretaker issue find the mother to be the
primary caretaker, when a finding of shared parenting duties is made, typically, the
father has won custody."63 This fact places an even greaterburden on women to prove
that they alone are the primary caretaker. Despite claims to the contrary by primary
caretaker presumption supporters, this might actually increase litigation. It will no
longer be enough for a parent to prove that she actively participated in the
childrearing responsibilities; the parent must also show that the other spouse was
delinquent in assuming his responsibilities.
B. The Presumption Does Not Necessarily Place
the Child with the Better Parent
Now that the other commentators on the subject have had their opportunity to
debate the merits of the primary caretaker presumption, I feel that it is important to
recognize two fatal flaws of the presumption that have not received much attention
in the legal press. First, there is no scientific, psychological, or sociological support
for the ten factors used by the presumption to determine who is the primary caretaker.
Although I admit that each of the factors presented by Chief Justice Neely is
important, I do not believe that it is necessarily an exhaustive or an accurate list.
The list of factors emphasizes 4 the day-to-day activities of a parent, but it does not
look at the intangible contributions made by many parents-both mothers and fathers.
"[T]he most serious problem with the primary caretaker standard is that it ignores the
quality of the relationship between the child and caretaker in favor of 'counting hours
62. Jennison, supra note 5, at 1153-54 n.72.
63. Kelly, supra note 28, at 22.
64. And in my view, it over-emphasizes these factors.
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and rewarding many repetitive behaviors."' 65 This clinical examination of a parent-
child relationship does nothing to salvage any glimmer of hope for a child caught in
the middle of a devastating dispute between her parents.
Many parents make conscious decisions about who will assume which role in
raising the children. These decisions are made at the outset of the marriage when the
concept of divorce is the farthest thing from the couples' minds. Are we saying that
we should punish one spouse because he was unlucky in which roles the two parents
together chose to undertake?
These factors do not recognize the financial and emotional contributions made by
many parents that cannot be quantified or categorized as coldly as the presumption
requires. The fact that one parent is supporting the family financially might allow the
other to be a better primary caretaker. A father might spend more time teaching his
daughter how to play softball, or a mother might spend time teaching her son how to
cook. Where do these activities go in the primary caretaker factors? Nowhere.
There are many bonding experiences between a parent and a child that are simply
not accounted for in the factors. "[Tihe factors delineating how to determine who the
primary caretaker is may not really be suitable in determining what is best for the
child. Does 'bonding' really equate with the volume of time spent with the child?
What is bonding, anyway?"66 "The primary caretaker test assumes that these bonds
exist between the primary caretaking parent and the child; they are evidenced by the
caretaker's sacrifice and devotion to the child. The test also assumes that the child
reciprocates this devotion."'67 My basic argument is that if we are going to use a list
of factors as a proxy for which parent has the closest bond with a child, we should at
least be sure that those factors actually represent that bond. Until there is more
conclusive proofthat such a representation is real, courts should not continue to apply
blindly the primary caretaker factors as determinative factors in child custody cases.
My second major problem with the primary caretaker presumption is that it does
not even purport to place the child with the better parent. A parent could be an
extremely poor parent, but still not be unfit, and that parent could be given custody
over a better parent, simply because he or she met more of Chief Justice Neely's
criteria. "[T]he primary caretaker presumption, unlike the best interests test, does not
promise to place each child with the best parent. To this extent, it seems less
child-centered and perhaps will place some children with the 'worse' parent."68 Any
custody doctrine which could force a judge knowingly to place a child with the
65. Barry, supra note 3, at 819 (quoting Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child
Custody, in 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 121, 130 (1994)).
66. Blakesley, supra note 3, at 641 (footnotes omitted).
67. LaFrance, supra note 3, at 52 (quoting Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 727, 771 (1988)).
68. Home, supra note 3, at 2141 (emphasis in original). Despite this, Home goes on to state
that "the available evidence suggests that the best interests test is no better. Except in a few
extreme circumstances, we generally cannot discover who is the 'best' parent." Id. at 2141-42
(emphasis in original).
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"worse" parent is in serious need of repair. "A primary caretaker presumption
assumes that families have a primary caretaker and, furthermore, that having a
primary caretaker is the best post-divorce arrangement."'69
IV. PuTING CHILDREN FIRST
The primary caretaker presumption, like most standards used in child custody
decisionmaking, does not recognize that children have rights and should not be
treated as though they were property. The primary caretaker presumption makes the
highest bidder in the custody auction, the parent who, supposedly, spent the most
time with the children during the marriage. This approach only recognizes the
parents' rights and not the rights of the children. As quoted in the introduction to this
Note, Judge Ash of the Tennessee Circuit Court argued that there had to be a better
way to make custody decisions than the way we do it now.7 Judge Ash goes on to say
that the place to start in formulating a better system is to recognize that children have
rights, too.
When making custody determinations, one should remember that children have
certain rights. These rights include: (1) the right to be with their natural parents
and siblings; (2) the right to good physical care with adequate food, clothing, and
shelter; (3) the right to education; (4) the right to emotional security; (5) the right
to diagnosis and treatment of medical and emotional conditions; (6) the right to
be protected from harm, injury, and neglect; (7) the right to controlled use of any
estate or property of the child for preservation and conservation of such property
in the child's best interests; and (8) the right to all guarantees and protections of
the federal and state constitutions.
7
'
The primary caretaker presumption fails, in that it does not recognize that children
caught in the middle of a custody battle have rights that the courts should be
protecting. 72
The approach offered by the primary caretaker presumption makes no steps toward
helping the child through the process. A child caught in her parents' divorce does not
care that some judge is applying some legal standard in determining with whom she
will live. That child wants to be treated with respect and understanding and she wants
her voice to be heard.
69. Bartlett, supra note 4, at 852.
70. See supra text accompanying note 1.
71. Ash, supra note 1, at 795.
72. See Federle, supra note 4, at 1549.
The primary caretaker presumption is merely another form of a parental
preference rule and .is subject to the same criticisms already made, namely, that
it tautologically equates the placement with the child's best interests. The
presumption also fails to minimize indeterminacy as more couples share parenting
responsibilities and may actually disadvantage children by directing courts to
order placements that are not responsive to their special educational or health
needs. Without some basis in a coherent account of children's rights, it is




Law reformers are constantly seeking magical solutions or formulas for
determining who should be awarded custody in divorce cases. While mathematical
formulas might work in determining child support payments, there are no such
mechanical tests for child placement. The focus in child custody today should not be
placed on searching for such tests, but rather on humanizing the process by which
custody disputes are resolved. This requires the judge to approach each case with an
open mind, apply the appropriate standards, and support the decision with specific
reasons.
73
By forcing judges into using a mechanized approach, the primary caretaker
presumption does not allow judges to adjust for the needs of the children involved.
I am not taking a position on whetherjudicial discretion is something to be embraced
or feared. What I am saying is that when the legal system becomes too mechanistic
and too formalistic, it loses its humanness. In many aspects of the legal system,
humanity is not necessary; in the family courts of America, however, humanity is
essential-for the children's sake.
CONCLUSION
The primary caretaker presumption for custody determination has not been
properly evaluated by the judiciary or the academic legal community and therefore
it should not be used when making custody decisions. On its face, it appears to be a
simple, gender-neutral, objective alternative to some of the other complicated
standards used by judges in making custody decisions. However, there is no evidence
that the primary caretaker factors actually measure parenting skills, and there is no
guarantee that a child will end up with the best parent if the court uses this
presumption. Finally, and most importantly, the primary caretaker presumption fails
to recognize that children have rights and concerns and need to be treated like human
beings in the family courts. For these reasons, I would abandon the use of the primary
caretaker presumption in all of its many forms.
73. See Katz, supra note 24, at 135.
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